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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
SHALAKO SHAWN PARKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 43363
Ada County Case No.
CR-2014-16370

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Parker failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of his unified sentence of six years, with two
years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to grand theft?

Parker Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Parker pled guilty to grand theft and the district court imposed a unified sentence
of six years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.59-63.) Parker filed a Rule 35 motion for a
reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.76-81.) Parker filed a

1

notice of appeal timely only from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.
(R., pp.82-84.)
Parker asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence because he “remained incarcerated in the Elmore
County Jail where he has been unable to participate in rehabilitative programming.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp.2-4.) Parker has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho
Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not function as an appeal of a
sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within statutory limits, a Rule 35
motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence
is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district
court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Absent the presentation of new evidence,
“[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review
the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440,
442 (2008).
Parker did not appeal the judgment of conviction in this case. On appeal, he
merely argues that the district court should have reduced his sentence pursuant to his
Rule 35 motion because he was still being housed in the county jail, where he was
“unable to participate in rehabilitative programming.” (Appellant’s brief, p.3.)

The

district court was aware, at the time of sentencing, that “its sentence impacts
Department of Correction programming decisions.”

(R., p.78.)

Further, “alleged

deprivation of rehabilitative treatment is an issue more properly framed for review either

2

through a writ of habeas corpus or under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.”
State v. Sommerfeld, 116 Idaho 518, 520, 777 P.2d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 1989) (affirming
district court's denial of defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion). Because Parker presented no
new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in the motion
that his sentence was excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he has failed
to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule 35
motion.
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Parker’s claim, Parker has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the district court’s
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal.
(Appendix A.)

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order
denying Parker’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2015.

_/s/_____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of November, 2015, served a true
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic
copy to:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/_____________________________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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CHRISiOPHER o. RICH, Clerk
By MARTHA LYKE
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IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2
3

4

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

5
6

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR-FE-2014-0016370

vs.

ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION

7

SHALAKO SHAWN PARKER,
Defendant.
9
10

On March 4, 2015, the Court sentenced Shalako Shawn Parker on Count I. Grand TheO,

11

Felony, LC. §§ 18-2403(1); -2407(1)(b), -2409, to an aggregate term of six (6) years, with a

12

minimum period of confinement of two (2) years, followed by a subsequent indctcnninnte period of

13

custody not to exceed four (4) years. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Court dismissed Count II.

14

Parker's counsel, August Cahill, timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence
pul'suant to Rule 35, I.C.R., on June IR, 2015. He requests a reduction of his sentence but makes no

15

specific recommendation.

l6

Parker also reqi1ests a hearing and the Court denies his request in an exercise of discretion.

17

I.C.R. 35 provides in part, as follows: "Motions to correct or modify sentences under this rule ...

18

shall he considered and dctennined by the court without the admission of additional testimony and

19

without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the cou11 in its discretion; ....
The burden is on a defendant to prove a sentence is unreasonable. State v. Burnight, 132

20

Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214, 219 (1999). Furthe1more, a motion for reconsideration MUST be supported
21

22

23

24
25

26

by new or additional information. It is not appropriate to simply rearguc the sentence. Thnt is not the
purpose of a motion for reconsideration.
A motion for reduction of a sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the comt. State v. Copenhover, 129 Idaho 494,
496, 927 P.2d 884, 886 (1996); State v. TJnnk, 127 Idaho J52, JSS, 900 P.2d 1363,
1366 (1995); Srate v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318,319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v.
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION
CASE NO. CR,FE'.-20145-0016370
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1

2
3

4
5

Allbee, 11 S Idaho 84S, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct.App. I989). Nevertheless, as
discussed above, our Supreme Court has held that a defendant presenting a Rule 35
motion must submit new or additional information in support of the motion, and
an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion "cannot be used as a vehicle to
review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new evidence."
Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 159 P.3d at 840. Accordingly, because Shumway
presented no new or additional evidence in support of his motion, we will not review
the reasonableness of the sentence nor disturb the district court's order denying

the motion.

6

State v. Sh11mw<1y, 144 Idaho 580, 583, 165 P.3d 294, 297 (Ct. App. 2007) (emphasis added). The

7

Idaho Supreme Court has made this clear.

8
9

10

II
12

13
14

However, Rule 35 docs not function as an appeal of a sentence. Instead, it is a
narrow rule allowing a trial court to correct an illegal sentence (at any time) or to
correct a sentence imposed iJ1 an illegal maimer (within 120 days). . . . When
presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show thnt the sentence is
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion. Knighton, 143 Idaho at 320, 144
P.3d at 25; State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3<l 956, 974 (2003); Stale v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 463, 50 P.3d 472, 478 (2002); see also State v. Wright, 134
Idaho 73, 79, 996 P.2d 292, 298 (2000). An appeal from the denial of a Ruic 35
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the
presentation of new infom1ation ....
State v. Hiiffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838,840 (2007)(emphasis added).

IS

In this case, Parker presents no new information. He argues that his mother has health

16

problems. However, this is not new information. The Court considered both his mother's health and

17

her comments at sentencing. It is not new information to observe that an i1unate may not be
immediately eligible for the work center or that the sentence impacts his eligibility for specific

18

programs. The Court was, and is, aware its sentence impacts Dcpa11mcnt of Correction programming
19

decisions.

20
21

22

23
24

25
26

ANALVSIS

Parker requests leniency because his mother is ill and he want~ to participate in rehabilitative
programs. The Court rejects his request. Rule 35, I.C.R., provides in pertinent part as follows:
(M)otions to correct or modify sentences under this rnle must be filed within 120 days
of the entry of the judgment imposing sentence or order releasing retained jurisdiction
and shall be considered and detennined by the court without the admission of
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless othcrwiiie ordered hy the court
in its discretion; ....
ORDER DENYING RULE 3S MOTION
CASE NO. CR-FE-20145-0016370
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2

The determination of whether to grant the relief requested by Parker is a matter committed to the
Court's discretion and the Court's decision is governed by the same standard as the original sentence.
2

See Slate v. Gardiner, 127 ldaho 156, 164,989 P.2d 615 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Ricks, 120 Idaho
875 (Ct. App. 1991 ). In this review, this Court has employed the standards set forth in State v.

4

5
6

7

Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Court understood that this was a matter of discretion and considered several factors both
in tht: original sentencing and in deciding this Motion for Reconsideration. A sentence has several
objectives: (l) protection of society, (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally, (3)
possibility of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment for wrongdoing. The primary consideration is, and

8
9

should be, "the good order and protection of society." State v. Toohi/1, l 03 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707
(Ct. App. 1982).

10

In any sentencing, the primary focus begins with a concern for protection of the public. In this

11

case, Parker pied guilty to Count I. Grand Theft, Felony, I.C. §§ 18-2403(1), -2407(l)(b), -2409. The

12

Court imposed an aggregate term of six (6) years, with a minimum period of confinement of two (2)
years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed four (4) years. The

13

maximum penalty for this offense is fourteen (14) years. The fixed portion of a sentence imposed

14

under the Unified Sentencing Act is treated as the tem1 of confinement for sentence review purposes.

15

State v. Hayes, 123 Idaho 26, 27, 843 P.2d 675,676 (Ct. App. 1992). The Court finds that a two (2)

16

year fixed sentence for Urand Theft is lenient considering the facts of this crime: an<l Parkt:r's

17

criminal history. It is well within the statutory sentence guidelines. Furthermore, the Court
considered the entirety of the sentence, including any indetenninate time.

18

In arriving at this sentence, the Cou1i considered Parker's character and any mitigating or
19

aggravating factors. The Court, however, found there were several aggravating factors in this case -

20

suggesting the need for this sentence. In particular, it is clear that Parker needs incarceration. The

21

Court's decision focused on rehabilitation and protection of society. Parker's criminal history

22

suggested the need for this sentence in order to properly rehabilitate him.

23

This was his third felony conviction. He has been convicted of felony Witness Intimidation
(2008) and felony Injury to Jail (2014).

24

25
26
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3

Parkel''s extensive misdemeanor conviclion 1 record in~lu<l~s D.U.I. (2014), Driving Without
Privileges/No License/Invalid License (2003, 2007, 2008, 2014), inattentive Dtiving (20142). Petit
2

Theft (2006), Battery (2003, 2004, 2006), Domestic Assault (2005), Domestic Assault in Presence of

3

a Child (2005, 2008), Use of Telephone to Harass (2004), Resisting and Obstruction (2003),

4

Trespass (2005), and contempts, probation violations, and failures to appear. As a juvenile beginning

5

when he was 13, he incurred juvenile charges of Battery (2001), Resisting Officers, Minor in

6

Possession of Alcohol (2002. 2003), and Driving Vehicle Without Owner's Consent (amended from
Burglary).

7

Since he was 13 years old, Parker has been incarcerated for all but 6 of those years.
8

In this case, he stole a disabled person's pick-up with all its belongings, including a debit

9

card which he used. While he was incarcerated at the Ada County Jail on this charge, he worked his

JO

way out of belly chains and swung them at the jail window, cracking it. He then threatened another

II

inmate and attempted to throw an unknown liquid at that inmate. When he was handcuffed, he

12

refused to allow the deputies lo remove those handcuffs and then "slipped" them. Parker again used

those handcuffs to break the window.
13

This was not the first time he acted out while incarcerated. The Court had previously retained

14

jurisdiction and Parker acted out while he was on that retained jurisdiction. Ultimately the

15

department of corrections recommended the Court relinquish jurisdiction, which it did. On other

16

occasions Parker received ve1y significant disciplinary sanctions. He threatened staff, flooded his

17
18

cell, disrespected staff, mutilated himself, refused orders, threatened other inmates, and incurred
many other disciplinary incidents.
The Court finds that this sentence folfills the objectives of protecting society and achieves

19

deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution, and therefore denies Parker's Motion for Reconsideration.

20

11' IS SO ORDERED.

21

DATED this 22nd day of June 2015.

~C.~

22

Cheri C. Copsey, Dis;J;/J-u~g~(T

23
24
25

26

1

Numerous cases were dismissed as purt of plcn ngrccmcnts, including felony Attempted Strangulation.
1. Am1:ndcd from leaving the scene of accident.
ORDF.R DENYING RULE 35 MOTION
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